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The principle of restraint: Public reason and the reform of public 
administration 
 
 
Gabriele Badano 
 
 
Abstract 
Normative political theorists have been growing more and more aware of the many difficult questions raised by the 
discretionary power inevitably left to public administrators. This article aims to advance a novel normative principle, 
FDOOHG¶SULQFLSOHRIUHVWUDLQW·UHJXODWLQJUHIRUPRIHVWDEOLVKHGDGPLQLVWUDWLYHDJHQFLHV,DUJXHWKDWWKHDELOity of public 
administrators to exercise their power in accordance with the requirements of public reason is protected by an attitude 
of restraint on the part of potential reformers. Specifically, they should refrain from any reform of an administrative 
agency that involves a switch to a considerably more loosely interconnected system of values underlying the work of 
that agency. To illustrate the importance of the principle of restraint, I examine a case from British health policy, 
showing that a recent reform of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence well exemplifies the serious 
problems brought by any violation of that principle.  
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The officials populating public administration agencies are much more than the rigid executors of policy 
decisions that popular belief sees them as. There is indeed a growing, although belated, recognition from 
within normative political theory that the large spaces of discretionary power inevitably left to public 
administrators call for in-depth analyses aimed at determining how discretion can be made consistent with 
the ideals that should govern our institutions. 
This article, which aims to provide one such analysis, has two main goals. My first goal is to put forward 
a novel normative principle regulating reform of any established administrative agency, laying down a set 
of circumstances under which elected politicians and other relevant actors should refrain from carrying out 
UHIRUP0\MXVWLILFDWLRQIRUWKLV¶SULQFLSOHRIUHVWUDLQW·which provides a strong reason against any reform 
condemning an administrative agency to serve a much more loosely interconnected set of ends than it 
previously did, is that it preserves the ability of public administrators to reason publicly about the 
discretionary decisions they face. To illustrate my justification for this principle, I use a recent reform to 
the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), an administrative body in charge of 
appraising health technologies for use in the British NHS. This reform, which saw NICE take over a 
dedicated fund for cancer drugs in 2016, well exemplifies a violation of my principle of restraint and the 
problems coming with it. My second goal is to take advantage of my discussion of the principle of restraint 
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to suggest that this principle can identify fresh reasons why commentators should criticise the cancer fund 
in question.  
My argument builds upon and aims to contribute to the vast literature on public reason in political 
philosophy and normative political theory. The basic idea behind public reason is that a specific method 
for reflecting upon and making decisions is called for when important issues are at stake and the decisions 
made about them will be backed by the power of the state. For example, judges and members of parliament 
will often, if not always, be subject to the discipline of public reason when on the job, while members of a 
church or an association typically are not if they meet to plan their activities as members of their church or 
association. 
Many appealing justifications have been proposed for the duty to provide public reasons. For some, this 
duty is justified by a principle of respect for the equal moral status of persons, none of whom are subject 
by nature to the will of others. For others, public reasons are needed to solve the tension between the idea 
that the public enjoy ultimate democratic authority over laws and policies and the fact that its members will 
routinely have to live with laws and policies shaped by others. Similarly, several accounts exist of exactly 
what it means to reason publicly.1 One influential account contends that to reason publicly is to refrain 
from supporting laws or policies if the only reasons we have for accepting them are grounded in our 
religious views, our conception of the good explaining how individuals should lead their personal lives, or 
RWKHU FRQWURYHUVLDO ¶FRPSUHKHQVLYH· GRFWULQHV (Rawls, 1997). Independently of whether comprehensive 
reasons can ever be public reasons, complying with public reason involves providing the public with a 
WUDQVSDUHQWMXVWLILFDWLRQIRURQH·VGHFLVLRQVDIHDWXUHWKDWZLOOEHFUXFLDOWRP\DUJXPHQW. 
After explaining the importance of the problems posed by public administration to normative political 
WKHRU\ DQG WKH IUDPHZRUN RI SXEOLF UHDVRQ LQ SDUWLFXODU VHFWLRQ  UHFRQVWUXFWV +HQU\ 5LFKDUGVRQ·V
compelling account of what it means to reason publicly at the level of public administration. Building on 
such an account, section 1 also introduces the novel principle of restraint before sketching a justification 
for it. Section 2 reconstructs the workings of NICE and its Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF), while section 3 
suggests that the issues raised by the CDF should be understood as a restructuring of the system of values 
served by NICE. 
7KHQHZHOHPHQWVLQWURGXFHGLQWR1,&(·VV\VWHPRIYDOXHVWKURXJKWKH&')FDQEHUHFRQFLOHGZLWK
its traditional commitments only if NICE settles for its mission being made up of considerably more loosely 
connected elements than used to be the case. Section 4 explains that this constitutes a violation of the 
principle of restraint before using the CDF to illustrate how violating that principle hinders the ability of 
public administrators to provide the public with transparent justifications. Section 4 also clarifies that the 
principle of restraint is best understood as providing pro tanto reasons against certain kinds of reform. 
Finally, section 5 replies to two possible objections. 
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1. Public administration, public reason, and restraint in reform 
Contrary to public perception, public administration agencies are in charge of much more than rigidly 
implementing decisions made by politicians. At all levels, public administrators are left considerable 
discretion in carrying out their jobs, not only because they have factual knowledge, coming from experience, 
of the sorts of cases typically dealt with by their agencies and how best to handle them to pursue pre-
determined goals. The discretion exercised by public administrators crucially involves important decisions 
about values, and it could not be otherwise. When handed down from above, the values a public 
administration agency is instructed to pursue often need to be left vague. The same value might need to be 
specified differently depending on context, and it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to pre-determine 
how values should be specified across the whole variety of concrete cases public administrators might face. 
For similar reasons, public administrators are left considerable leeway in arbitrating the conflicts that often 
arise in practice among the multiple values that their agency is instructed to pursue. 
3XEOLF DGPLQLVWUDWRUV· GLVFUHWLRQ LV ZHOO known to political scientists (Evans, 2010; Friedrich, 1940; 
Gailmard and Patty, 2007; Lipsky, 2010; Sowa and Selden, 2003) but has received little attention within 
normative political theory. Still, as stressed by a recent and growing literature, large spaces of discretionary 
power exercised by unelected officials open extremely important normative questions about how such 
spaces should be regulated and how administrators should exercise discretion so as to satisfy important 
political ideals. For example, Joseph Heath explores the requirements of accountability that should be met 
by public administrators, stressing in particular accountability to other administrators (Heath, 2014). John 
Boswell and Jack Corbett argue that public administration agencies should become more inclusive, 
transparent and justificatory, to create positive feedback loops that might motivate members of the general 
public to behave more deliberatively (Boswell and Corbett, 2018). Bernardo Zacka lays down a set of 
standards (efficiency, fairness, responsiveness and respect) that should guide street-level bureaucrats, calling 
on them to develop appropriate dispositions and an appropriate character (Zacka, 2017) 
My particular interest in public administration is linked to several ideals discussed by these theorists. 
Specifically, I am interested in the way the acknowledgment of the discretion inevitably left to public 
administrators should work as a call to arms for the authors working from within the framework of public 
reason. Public reason theorists stress that law and policy decisions, backed by the coercive sanctions of the 
state, impose a specific burden on the actors making them: a duty to make such decisions so that they can 
be justified to the public. Therefore, the fact that public administrators make crucial discretionary decisions 
about policy should leave a particularly strong impression on them. Is it possible to reason publicly at the 
level of public administration, and if it is, what are the conditions that enable public reasoning at that level? 
Until reassuring answers are provided to these questions, one might fear that many policy decisions in our 
administrative-heavy states are completely beyond the reach of public reason. 
Public reason theorists are attentive to the differences among the choice situations faced by decision-
makers at different levels, like the judiciary, representative institutions, and so forth, proposing different 
accounts of what it means to reason publicly at each level (Greenawalt, 1995; Rawls, 1997: 783-787). 
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Although, in line with the rest of political theory, comparatively little attention has so far been paid to public 
DGPLQLVWUDWRUV+HQU\5LFKDUGVRQFRQYLQFLQJO\SXWVIRUZDUGKLVWKHRU\RI¶VSHFLILFDWLRQ·DVWKHVKDSHWKDW
public reason should take specifically at the level of public administration. 
Elected politicians have no choice but to leave considerable room for administrators to creatively add 
content to the abstract directives provided to them, so as to bring such directives to bear on the concrete 
tasks each administrative agency is in charge of and, crucially, to manage the tensions among values that 
emerge during the process. This now-familiar feature of public administration is connected to the 
ramification of political decision-making in administrative-heavy states, where difficult questions are broken 
down into progressively smaller pieces in the passage from parliaments and government cabinets to 
different government departments, and then to administrative agencies (Richardson, 2002: 227). 
Specification is apt for public administration agencies in that it aims to explain how decision-makers can 
still be guided by loyalty to the directives and, therefore, the framework of values handed down to them 
from above, either through legislation or otherwise, even in this context (Richardson, 2002: 215-219).  
As a public reason theorist, Richardson stresses that administrators are supposed to make creative 
decisions in their public capacity. Consequently, they have a duty of justification towards the public. At a 
minimum, this means that the reasoning behind decisions must be such that it can be opened up and 
transparently explained to the public, therefore excluding outright appeals to the opaque intuitive sense 
that, for example, a certain course of action is just wrong. This is a taller order than it might seem because, 
as explained by Richardson, the balancing of conflicting values in a purely intuitive manner is widely seen 
as the only way to give answers to concrete practical problems once we recognise that there often is a 
plurality of irreducible and conflicting values relevant to the issues at hand. Crucially, intuitive balancing of 
plural values is by nature impossible to make transparent to others.2 
How can these desiderata for the public reasoning of public administrators be kept together? The search 
for coherence among plural values is crucial to doing so. According to Richardson, administrative agencies 
should feel free to amend the parameters set for them from above by narrowing such parameters, 
specifically by adding clauses that determine, for example, in what specific circumstances and by what 
specific means a certain policy end should be pursued. However, loyalty to the original parameters is 
safeguarded because this process of narrowing down should follow a very specific train of thought. 
Administrators should reflect upon the point behind the various directives they are handed down and see 
whether it is possible to revise them through narrowing them down in such a way that it would bring them 
all closer together, as in a more coherent big picture,Q5LFKDUGVRQ·VZRUGVWKLVSURFHVVRIDPHQGLQJWKHHnds of 
SROLF\ DLPV WR ¶H[SODLQ VRPH RI WKHP LQ WHUPV RI RWKHUV· QRW MXVW WR HVWDEOLVK ORJLFDO FRQVLVWHQF\ E\
UHPRYLQJSRVVLEOHWHQVLRQVDPRQJWKHP5LFKDUGVRQ+HUHKHIROORZV-RKQ5DZOV·VLQIOXHQWLDO
idea of a wide reflective equilibrium, proposed as a model of justification in political philosophy, where 
PDQ\IRUFHIXOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIWHQSXOOLQGLIIHUHQWGLUHFWLRQV,QWKLVFRQWH[WMXVWLILFDWLRQLVDPDWWHU¶RI
HYHU\WKLQJ ILWWLQJ WRJHWKHU LQWR RQH FRKHUHQW YLHZ· DIWHU D SURFHVV RI UHYLVLRQ through which some 
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considerations are amended or even rejected to progressively create a greater overall equilibrium (Rawls, 
1971: 19). 
2QH RI 5LFKDUGVRQ·V H[DPSOHV ZLOO KHOS EHWWHU FODULI\ VSHFLILFDWLRQ This example responds to the 
criticism that different government agencies devote different levels of effort to preventing fatalities. 
According to Richardson, to attack the US National Park Service for spending less than other agencies on 
safety in their management of the Grand Canyon is to miss the ramified nature of public administration, 
where different agencies are handed down different mixes of ends. Unlike, say, nuclear power regulators, 
the mission of the National Park Service in managing the Grand Canyon is centred on enabling the aesthetic 
enjoyment of sublime untamed nature. The safety of visitors is certainly part of the mix, but the only way 
to translate this end into practical measures that sit well with the overall mission of the National Park Service is 
to specify it in terms of safety measures of a restrained kind, such as discreet warning signs, not widespread 
fencing (Richardson, 2002: 237-241). Similar points can be made about other values. For example, the 
National Park Service rightly cares about accessibility to visitors, pursued through the construction, among 
other things, of roads and hospitality centres. Specification requires that decision-makers be focused on 
figuring out how to design new constructions so that they can fit most neatly within their DJHQF\·Vmission. 
Given that it is the enjoyment of untamed nature that should be enabled for the visitors to the Grand 
Canyon, new constructions will have to be unobtrusive, interfering as little as possible with the main 
observation points. Importantly, as exemplified by these cases, it seems perfectly feasible to transparently 
H[SODLQ WRRWKHUVKRZDFHUWDLQSRVVLEOHVSHFLILFDWLRQRIDQDJHQF\·VYDOXHV OHDGV WR WKHPRVWFRKHUHQW
picture of its mission, making specification into a full-blown model of public reasoning. 
5LFKDUGVRQ·VDFFRXQWRIVSHFLILFDWLRQSURYLGHVVROLGIRXQGDWLRQVIRUDWKHRU\RISXEOLFUHDVRQDWWKH
level of public administration. It offers an appealing synthesis between (i) the recognition that internal 
tensions are unavoidable and any administrative agency must find a way to handle conflicts among its plural 
values, and (ii) the idea that the solution is for administrators to search for coherence in the sense of closest 
ILW ZLWKLQ WKHLU DJHQF\·V PLVVLRQ &RQVHTXHQWO\ , ZLOO HPSOR\ VSHFLILFDWLRQ as the shape that public 
DGPLQLVWUDWRUV· SXEOLF UHDVRQLQJ VKRXOG WDNH. Still, Richardson leaves many open questions. In his 
necessarily schematic representation of specification, the set of values that specifiers must handle is closed 
in that while the values from the set can be continuously revised through specification, no brand-new 
general value will be added from the outside later on in the process.3 This framing, however, neglects a key 
part of the dynamic nature of the values of administrative agencies, whose missions are routinely questioned 
from above, with politicians frequently considering whether they should be reformed. 
Such reforms can foster or hamper the ability of administrative agencies to reason publicly through 
specification. Unless we analyse such reforms, our understanding of public reason at the level of public 
administration will be incomplete in that we will be ignoring an important enabler of administrative public 
reason. Accordingly, this article aims to start a discussion of how to reform existing administrative agencies 
to protect their ability to satisfy public reason. Specifically, I intend to focus on the way this ability can be 
hindered by introducing new ends into an ongoing process of specification. 
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7KLVDUWLFOH·VPDLQFRQWULEXWLRQLVWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIthe principle of restraint (PR). PR lays down that 
elected politicians or, more generally, the actors considering whether to revise an administrative agenF\·V
mission should refrain from any reform that involves a switch to a considerably less tightly interconnected 
system of values underlying the work of the agency in question. PR excludes reforms that would turn the 
clock way back on the search for coherence that Richardson depicts as crucial to public administrators· 
public reasoning. My discussion of PR will highlight that specification only works within certain limits; if 
WKHUHLVWRRPXFKGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQDQDJHQF\·VGLIIHUHQWYDOXHVDGPLQLVWUDWRUVEHcome unable to reason 
publicly through specification. 
We have seen that for Richardson, a mission whose constituent elements can be closely connected to 
and partially explained in terms of one another is necessary to bring general directives to bear on concrete 
cases in a discursive way that therefore can be transparently explained. With the National Park Service, for 
example, the search for coherence around the central notion that the Grand Canyon National Park is about 
the sublime enjoyment of untamed nature enabled reasoned distinctions between different candidates as 
concrete safety and accessibility measures that would have otherwise been impossible to draw. 
What if PR was violated and the logical distance between the different values guiding the National Park 
Service grew considerably? What if the National Park Service was instructed to consider itself as being as 
much about enabling the sublime enjoyment of untamed nature as about subsidising the hospitality 
industry? Faced with this new and more extreme clash of ends, the agency would stop making transparent 
sense to its public when deciding whether massive hotels and restaurants should be allowed in the most 
breath-taking spots of the Grand Canyon, or when answering other questions where the two ends pull in 
opposite directions. This is because the possibility would be gone of arbitrating such value conflicts by 
reducing them to the question of what solutions would further with the greatest integrity the sublime 
enjoyment of untamed nature. Decision-makers would have no choice but to pick sides through intuitive 
balancing of the relative importance of the values involved. However, intuitions are by nature impossible 
to fully explain to others, violating a basic requirement of public reasoning. 
To place my argument for PR on firmer ground, I now turn to a recent reform to NICE, a public body 
ZRUNLQJDWDUP·VOHQJWKIURPWKH%ULWLVK'HSDUWPHQWRIHealth. NICE is relevant here because, as discussed 
in the next two sections, it not only has traditionally enjoyed considerable discretion in filling large gaps 
within the abstract parameters set for it from above EXWDOVRVKDUHV5LFKDUGVRQ·VUHJDUGIRUWransparency 
and justification. The reform I aim to analyse, which saw NICE take over the CDF, constitutes a clear 
violation of PR and will help me illustrate the serious problems associated with loss of coherence. Also, to 
look at the CDF promises to be fruitful in that PR provides non-obvious reasons why commentators should 
be critical of it.  
 
2. NICE and CDF 
Founded in 1999, NICE appraises drugs and other health technologies. It issues recommendations as to 
whether local NHS commissioners in England and Wales should purchase the health technologies that have 
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been referred to NICE for evaluation. To issue a recommendation, NICE requires evidence about the 
financial costs and clinical effectiveness of the technology under appraisal, where effectiveness is expressed 
in terms of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). Based on this evidence, NICE calculates whether the added 
cost to the NHS of funding the technology would fall below £20000-£30000 per QALY gained³1,&(·V
famous cost-effectiveness threshold. 
NICE explains that in the context of finite healthcare budgets, commissioning a new technology that is 
more expensive than the one currently employed for the same purpose always has opportunity costs³
benefits lost by divesting from other services in the NHS. Therefore, through the comparison with its cost-
effectiveness threshold, NICE checks whether funding the appraised technology would create more 
QALYs for its patients than it would displace somewhere else in the NHS (NICE, 2013: 14). 
Cost-per-QALY estimates and, therefore, the cost-effectiveness of technologies provide the centrepiece 
RI 1,&(·V GHFLVLRQ-making method but are not the only consideration driving its recommendations. 
Although NICE is extremely unlikely to reject any technology falling below £20000/QALY, it can approve 
technologies that cost between £20000 and £30000 or, in exceptional circumstances, even beyond £30000 
per added QALY if they are supported by other considerations, including severity of the target disease, 
socio-economic disadvantage of potential recipients, a special premium placed on health benefits delivered 
to end-of-life patients, and WKHSURYLVLRQRI¶LQQRYDWLYH·KHDOWKJDLQVWKDWFDQQRWEHSURSHUO\FDSWXUHGE\
the QALY.4 Therefore, NICE decision-makers reach well beyond cost-effectiveness, examining a variety 
of other considerations grounded in values like fairness and compassion. Creating a link with the previous 
VHFWLRQ·VGLVFXVVLRQRISXEOLF UHDVRQLQJ1,&(KDV D VWURQJ FRPPLWPHQW WR WUDQVSDUHQWO\ MXVWLI\LQJ LWV
decisions, including the way all relevant considerations combine to form supporting rationales (NICE, 2008: 
10). 
SincH-XO\1,&(·VSURFHVVKDVEHHQIXUWKHUFRPSOLFDWHGEHFDXVH1,&(WRRNRYHUWKH&')ZKLFK
had been running independently of NICE (and suffering from great financial problems) for a few years. 
1,&(·VUHYROXWLRQLVHG&')LVDULQJ-fenced fund with an annual budget of £340 million, to be used to 
UHVROYHWKHXQFHUWDLQW\VXUURXQGLQJQHZFDQFHUGUXJVWKDWQRQHWKHOHVVKDYHWKHSRWHQWLDOWRVDWLVI\1,&(·V
cost-effectiveness threshold and the other criteria outlined in the previous paragraph. The most 
conspicuous change brought to NICE by the CDF is that in appraising cancer drugs, NICE can now issue 
a new kind of recommendation. In addition to either simply recommending a cancer drug for routine use 
under the NHS or rejecting it as clear example of bad value for money, NICE can now decide that it should 
LQVWHDGEHIXQGHGIRUXSWR WZR\HDUV ¶XQGHU WKH&')· LI WKHHYLGHQFHDERXWFRVWVDQGEHQHILWVVKRZV
¶plausible potential for a drug to satisfy the criteria for routine commissioning, but « there is currently too 
much uncertainty surrounding the clinical data and consequently the cost-effectiveness estimates to make 
VXFKDUHFRPPHQGDWLRQ·NHS England, 2016: 11). 
When recommending a drug under the CDF, NICE identifies the areas of uncertainty and develops a 
framework for data collection aimed at resolving it. The pharmaceutical producer must commit itself to 
collecting the data as instructed while the drug is funded under the CDF. At the end of the two-year period, 
8 
 
NICE will reconvene to decide, in light of the new data, whether the £/QALY ratio of the drug in question 
is actually favourable and, subsequently, whether it should be recommended for routine commissioning. 
$Q LPSRUWDQW HOHPHQW RI 1,&(·V GDWD-collection instructions is the primacy enjoyed by so-called 
observational data, obtained through registries established in the NHS to systematically collect data about 
cancer patients and their response to therapies. NICE states that cancer registries are ¶WKHSUHIHUUHGRSWLRQ
IRUGDWDFROOHFWLRQLQWKH&')·¶FRXOGEHWKHVROHVRXUFHRIRXWFRPHGDWD·DQG¶ZLOODOZD\VDFFRPSDQ\DQ\
RWKHUGDWDVRXUFH·1,&(%HFDXVH1,&(DLPVWRIXQGGUXJVXQGHUWKH&')IRUQRORQJHUWKDQ
two years, the idea of inLWLDWLQJQHZUDQGRPLVHGFOLQLFDOWULDOV5&7VZKLFKWDNHFRQVLGHUDEOHWLPH¶ZRXOG
QHHGFDUHIXOFRQVLGHUDWLRQ·1,&( 
 
3. A new framing for the problems raised by 1,&(·s CDF 
7KH&')ORZHUV1,&(·VHYLGHQtiary bar for issuing a positive recommendation for cancer drugs at two 
levels. First, the option to recommend a drug under the CDF is all about accepting, although temporarily, 
a greater amount of uncertainty about its cost-effectiveness than NICE tolerated in the past or will tolerate 
with other kinds of technologies. Second, consider the decision to have RCTs take a back seat to 
observational studies when it comes to collecting the data that will determine whether a cancer drug will be 
routinely commissioned after the CDF funding has ended. This decision makes positive recommendations 
on exit from the CDF more likely because compared to RCTs, observational studies are known to 
exaggerate the positive clinical effects of treatments and to be less sensitive to possible harmful effects, 
because of R&7V·DELOLW\WREHWWHUprevent biases (such as selection and performance biases) that tend to be 
skewed in the direction of positive results (Howick, 2011: 39-7REHVXUHZKHQUHFRQVWUXFWLQJ1,&(·V
traditional approach to the assessment of clinical evidence, NICE decision-makers explain that NICE has 
never given absolute priority to RCTs; observational studies are needed alongside RCTs because both have 
limitations that the other approach helps to compensate for (Littlejohns et al., 2010). However, NIC(·V
WUDGLWLRQDODSSURDFKQHYHUDPRXQWHGWR¶DSOHDWRDEDQGRQ5&7VDQGVXEVWLWXWHWKHPZLWKREVHUYDWLRQDO
VWXGLHV·5DZOLQVRUDVKDVKDSSHQHGZLWKWKH&')WRJLYe priority to observational studies 
over RCTs. 
These elements have already been criticised from an epistemic perspective. For example, the central role 
of observational studies has been GHVFULEHGDV ¶DPDMRUFDXVHRIFRQFHUQ·because of their comparative 
openness to bias, exacerbated by the conflicts of interest of pharmaceutical companies in charge of 
collecting data (Grieve et al., 2016). What matters here, however, is that the choice to lower the evidentiary 
bar for positive recommendations is an issue of value, providing an instance of value reform. NICE itself 
traces its need to make value judgements back to the fact that the best available evidence about costs and 
FOLQLFDOHIIHFWLYHQHVV¶LVQRWDOZD\VRIJRRGTXDOLW\DQGKDUGO\HYHUFRPSOHWH· (NICE, 2008: 4). Given that 
scientific research never gives NICE absolute certainty as to whether a certain technology satisfies the 
£20000-£30000/QALY cost-effectiveness threshold and its other considerations, NICE must choose how 
much certainty is enough to recommend the technology. Any such choice to set the evidentiary bar 
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somewhere (or to move it) is not scientific in nature, and the only nonarbitrary way of making that choice 
is to adjudicate between the values fostered by a stricter approach to evidentiary standards and those 
fostered by a laxer approach.  
In short, underlying the changes brought by the CDF is an implicit restructuring of part of the 
IUDPHZRUNRI YDOXHV VHUYHGE\1,&(·VSURFHVV WhDWYDOXHV DUHSURPRWHGE\1,&(·V VKLIW WR D OD[HU
approach to the evidence needed for the approval of cancer drugs, and what values suffer from it? 
Regarding the values fostered by that shift, a natural answer points to onco-exceptionalism: the idea that 
cancer is a uniquely terrible disease and, therefore, higher priority should be placed on the treatment of 
cancer patients vis-à-vis patients affected by diseases that are equally serious in terms of QALYs lost. Indeed, 
there is no plan for, say, a Cardiovascular Disease Drugs Fund. Still, I intend to bracket onco-exceptionalism 
here because a closer look reveals that 1,&(·V&')GRHVQRWreally put a premium on the fight against 
cancer at large, which helps us identify another value as centrally fostered by the CDF. 
The CDF makes life easier for cancer pharmaceuticals alone. As discussed in the debate surrounding the 
transition of the CDF into NICE, this fact heavily short-changes cancer patients because greater health 
benefits would accrue to them if the &')·V money was redirected towards cancer technologies like 
radiotherapy, surgery, and diagnostics (e.g., Jack, 2014). Despite these objectionsWKHUHPLWRI1,&(·V&')
was not extended beyond drugs. Consequently, onco-exceptionalism is not the whole story, and there is at 
least another important value served in its own right by the CDF: facilitating drug coverage, or, in other words, 
facilitating the growth of the pharmaceutical industry. 
It has already been noted that recent British governments have seen the subsidisation of pharma as one 
important end of health policy. The creation of the old CDF has been explained with reference to it 
(Maynard and Bloor, 2015: 221). Also, the protection of industry appeared to win the day once before in 
1,&(·V recent history: in 2014, NICE refused to lower its cost-effectiveness threshold although long-
awaited evidence had emerged about opportunity costs in the NHS, demonstrating that the threshold 
should be set as low as £13000/QALY (Maynard and Bloor, 2015: 220). This UHDGLQJRI1,&(·VUHIXVDOWR
lower its threshold is confirmed by the explanation for such refusal provided by Andrew DiOORQ1,&(·V
chief executive. AFFRUGLQJWR'LOORQ¶reducing the threshold to £13000 per QALY would mean the NHS 
closing the door on most new treatments· WKHUHIRUH IRUJHWWLQJ goals that government valued highly, 
LQFOXGLQJ¶encouraging an innovative UK research base· (Dillon, 2015). 
The protection of pharma might seem innocuous enough. However, against the background of finite 
NHS budgets, caution must be exercised before spending anything on a new treatment because the 
necessary resources could always be used on other beneficial interventions that will otherwise go unfunded. 
Therefore, it is extremely important that we are strongly confident that the new technology provides greater 
value for money than those that will have to be displaced or, more generally, those that could have been 
provided instead. 
By accepting more of a promissory note than usual on entry into the CDF, and by privileging research 
methods at the end of the CDF period that are biased towards positive results, NICE greatly increases its 
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risk of recommending funding for drugs that actually do not meet the £20000-£30000/QALY threshold 
and its other considerations. This increased risk hinders 1,&(·VDELOLW\ to foster aggregated population health 
through its recommendations and also its ability to promote good value for NHS resources according to 1,&(·V 
set of criteria, bringing cost-per-QALY estimates together with other considerations (special attention paid 
to severity of disease, the end-of-life premium, and so forth). This tension with population health and value 
for money is further compounded by the fact, noted above, that £20000-£30000/QALY is already an 
unrealistically generous estimate of the level beyond which new technologies displace more QALYs in the 
NHS than they create.  
One aspect of this clash of values is particularly relevant to my argument. As I now proceed to 
demonstrate, while the commitment to facilitating drug approval is DUHFHQWDGGLWLRQWR1,&(·Vmission, 
the values damaged by the new CDF arrangements have a long history within NICE. Of course, NICE has 
revised its process many times since its inception, finding room for values as diverse as cost-effectiveness, 
fairness, and compassion. However, until recently NICE did that by integrating the inputs it received from 
government into a rather coherent big picture of a watchdog, making sure that technologies only receive a 
share of scarce taxpayers·PRQey if they guarantee good value for patients. The protection of industry found 
QRVSDFHLQ1,&(·VWUDGLWLRQDOPLVVLRQ³a fact that will take us back to PR. 
Ever since an early amendment to LWV(VWDEOLVKPHQW2UGHU1,&(KDVEHHQLQVWUXFWHGWRVHFXUH¶WKH
effective use of available resources LQWKHKHDOWKVHUYLFH· and, therefore, to pay attention to the opportunity 
costs of new technologies (Statutory Instrument 1999 n. 2219, 1999). The Directions from the Secretary of 
State for Health, published in 2005, legally require NICE to FRQVLGHU¶WKHEURDGEDODQFHRIclinical benefits 
DQGFRVWV·, therefore endorsing an interpretation of relevant opportunity costs as value lost for patients (and 
not, say, for industry) (Directions and Consolidating Directions to the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence, 2005, emphasis added) 7KLV LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LV FRQILUPHG E\ .DOLSVR &KDONLGRX·V
reconstruction of the objectives that the government laid out for NICE when it was created. The goal of 
translating WD[SD\HUV· PRQH\ LQWR SRSXODWLRQ KHDOWK ILJXUHd prominently, alongside the reduction of 
geographical variation in care quality (Chalkidou, 2009: 3). This interpretation of the value to be created by 
NICE can still be found in the recently-published NICE Charter, ZKRVHLQWURGXFWLRQWR1,&(·Vmission 
is punctuated by statements picturing NICE as aiming WR¶GHOLYHUWKHEHVWSRVVLEOHFDUH·RU¶WKHEHVWYDOXH
IRUSDWLHQWV·ZLWKLQDYDLODEOHUHVRXUFHV (NICE, 2014). 
This is not to say that before 1,&(·V&')H[LVWHd, NICE had pursued a strict understanding of value 
for money as aggregated population health. To be sure, 1,&(·Vcreation and first few years were deeply 
influenced by an approach to health economics that is fond of pure cost-effectiveness analysis, developing 
NICE in the direction of a tool to maximise QALYs and, therefore, population health for the amount of 
money available (Williams, 2004). However, often because of external pressure coming from government, 
over the years NICE incorporated into its methods several ¶RWKHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQV·, which can outweigh cost-
effectiveness and often embed very different values from it. For instance, as mentioned in the previous 
section, a few of them oppose to cost-effectLYHQHVV·s purely maximising logic a regard, grounded in fairness, 
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for who gets healthcare benefits; based on such considerations, a QALY creates greater value if its 
beneficiaries are badly-off, e.g. in terms of severity of disease or socio-economic status. Still, while 
progressively expanding relevant sources of value beyond cost-effectiveness, for a long time NICE 
managed to stay within a coherent picture of its mission, focused on securing all dimensions of value for 
money for the recipients of NHS interventions. 
The end-of-life premium is a great case in point. NICE introduced it in 2009, in response to political 
pressure picking up on complaints that NICE had been rejecting too many terminal cancer drugs (Cookson, 
2013: 1133-1134). However, when specifying this new criterion, NICE managed to identify general 
circumstances for its application that capture a minimally plausible account of added value to patients 
created by the technologies satisfying them, although this account strays far from cost-effectiveness. In 
deciding that unfavourable cost-per-QALY estimates (effectively up to £50000/QALY) would be tolerated 
if patients had less than twenty-four months to live without the technology under appraisal and such 
technology added at least three months to their life expectancy, NICE appeared to make room for a new 
mix of considerations, such as the extreme severity of the diseases in question, the magnified subjective 
importance that a few more weeks can have at the end of life, and perhaps compassion for patients who 
might need those extra weeks to set their personal affairs in order (NICE, 2009). Note the contrast with 
the CDF, which does not make any effort to restrict attention to patients who lack alternative treatments 
or for whom the drug in question would otherwise create an exceptional amount of value. 
In sum, until recently industry growth was not SDUWRI1,&(·VPLVVLRQLQLWVRZQULJKW. The nature of 
NICE as a watchdog, in charge of keeping industry in check, is confirmed by the very first principle NICE 
gives to itself in its publication Social Value Judgements; LIWKHUHLV¶QRWHQRXJKHYLGHQFHRQZKLFKWRUHDFKD
FOHDUGHFLVLRQ·1,&(VKRXOGQHYHUUHFRPPHQGin favour of a drug (NICE, 2008: 16). To be sure, NICE has 
always been instructed to include the diffusion of innovation among its goals. However, while the 
promotion of bare innovation is connected to a concern for industry growth, the instructions handed down 
to NICE always urged it to promote ¶WKHEHQHILWVWRWKH1+6·WKDWLQQRYDWLRQPLJKWKDYH (Directions and 
Consolidating Directions to the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2005), or ¶KLJK-YDOXH·
innovation (Chalkidou, 2009: 3). When innovation was formally integrated LQWR1,&(·V method, it was in 
fact reduced WRWKHDELOLW\WRPDNH¶DVLJQLILFDQWDQGVXEVWDQWLDOLPSDFWRQKHDOWK-related benefits that are 
XQOLNHO\WREHLQFOXGHGLQWKH4$/<FDOFXODWLRQ· (NICE, 2013: 19). IQFRQWUDVWZLWKWKH&')·VUHOD[LQJRI
evidentiary standards, and echoing Social Value Judgements· ILUVW SULQFLSOH WKRVH EHQHILWV PXVW EH
¶GHPRQVWUDEOH· (NICE, 2013: 73). 
 
4. Placing restraint on firmer ground 
7KHFUHDWLRQRI1,&(·V&')LVSDUWRIDSURFHVVWKDWSHUIHFWO\H[HPSOLILHVDYLRODWLRQRI35The CDF 
constitutes a sharp break with, if not a betrayal of, what NICE stood for until recently. For around fifteen 
years, NICE was committed to the specification of a broadly coherent picture of itself as a watchdog, 
essentially pitted against industry, or at least narrowly focused on the interests of NHS patients in cautiously 
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recommending how to use scarce taxpayer money. With the CDF and 'LOORQ·VGHIHQFHRI1,&(·Vdecision 
to stick to the £20000-£30000/QALY threshold, NICE has effectively transitioned from industry 
watchdog to industry watchdog and industry facilitator, entrusted to pursue an end³industry 
subsidisation³that comes at the expense of NHS patients whenever it is pursued in its own right. 
The goal of furthering the interests of patients and that of furthering the interests of pharma could be 
UHFRQFLOHGLQDUHYROXWLRQLVHGSLFWXUHRI1,&(·VPLVVLRQEXWRQO\E\PRYLQJWRDOHYHOZKHUHWKHGLIIHUHQW
HOHPHQWVPDNLQJXS1,&(·VPLVVLRQDUHmuch more loosely connected than they traditionally were. NICE 
would have to accept that it is now in charge of a much broader understanding of the sorts of value that 
can be produced within available NHS resources, for patients, for industry, and perhaps for society at large. 
As stated in section 1, PR excludes precisely these sorts of great losses of coherence in an agency·VPLVVLRQ. 
This reform of NICE well illustrates my point that violating PR leads to a drastically reduced ability, on 
the part of administrators, to transparently justify decisions to the public. Let us go back to the time when 
new empirical studies emerged that examined the cost of a QALY in the NHS, concluding that 1,&(·V
threshold should be lowered. Assuming that NICE was at that time already committed to both pushing 
pharma to deliver value for money for patients and subsidising industry, it would have looked equally logical 
to respond to the empirical evidence by leaving the threshold at its current level or by lowering it. 
$V LQ VHFWLRQ ·V K\SRWKHWLFDO FDVH LQ ZKLFK WKH National Park Service is instructed to add the 
subsidisation of the hospitality industry to the core of its mission, 1,&(·VOoss of coherence involves the 
loss of precious argumentative resources to transparently explain why it should go one way rather than the 
other in the face of difficult questions. Indeed, if Dillon had been pushed to provide a full justification for 
1,&(·VFKRLFHWROHDYHWKHWKUHVKROGas it was, it is difficult to imagine him doing more than resorting to 
intuitive balancing, explaining that in the case at hand, the growth of pharma felt weightier than the health 
benefits lost through displacement across the NHS. In contrast, an alternate version of NICE still 
unambiguously built around the guardianship of SDWLHQWV· interests would have had clear what it should 
choose: lower the threshold. Importantly, the fit between that choice and the pursuit of good value for 
patients within scarce resources could have easily provided NICE with a transparent justification for it, 
without any need to fall back on intuitions. 
Turning to a hypothetical example that is more closely focused on cancer drugs, what if questions were 
raised³for example, through parliamentary oversight of NICE³about whether the evidentiary bar for 
positive recommendations regarding cancer drugs is set precisely at the right level?  Specifically, it could be 
asked whether NICE should not further relax the requirements regulating the evidence to be provided in 
support of drugs on exit from the CDF, perhaps by admitting other forms of observational evidence that 
might be widely available but even more prone than currently-used registries to exaggerate GUXJV· clinical 
effectiveness. 
Obviously, NICE could reply that it is unwilling to lower the evidentiary bar any further because any 
step in that direction would feel like pursuing one RI1,&(·Vgoals (industry subsidisation) at too high a 
cost for another (value for money across potential NHS patients). However, the question is, would NICE 
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be able to dig deeper, providing also a discursive justification to transparently explain this reply to the public, 
or would this act of intuitively balancing two disparate considerations be all they can offer? Again, it is 
extremely difficult to imagine how NICE could offer anything more than the brute and opaque act of 
intuitive weighting, now that PR has been violated and, therefore, key justificatory resources are gone that 
were provided by NICE when cultivating a broadly coherent picture of its mission as centred around 
pushing pharma to deliver value for money for patients. In contrast, a clearly articulated justification could 
be provided if NICE could unambiguously picture its mission as centred on the pursuit of the interests of 
NHS patients in the context of scarce resources. This pursuit would require NICE to closely monitor the 
opportunity costs that any newly recommended drug has for patients across the NHS and, in turn, to reject 
further reliance on observational evidence known to systematically exaggerate the positive effects of new 
drugs. 
1,&(·V &') KDV VWUHQJWKHQHG P\ FDVH IRU 35 E\ LOOXVWUDWLQJ WKH LPSHGLPHQWV WR DGPLQLVWUDWLYH
DJHQFLHV·SXEOLFUHDVRQLQJWKDWDUHEURXJKWE\UHIRUPVWKDWviolate PR. It has also reinforced my call for a 
wide-ranging theory of public reason at the level of public administration, which does not stop with 
5LFKDUGVRQ·V DFFRXQWRI specification as the reasoning method that should guide public administrators. 
Given the impact of UHIRUPVOLNH1,&(·V&'), such theory should also include a thorough analysis of how 
to reform administrative agencies to protect their ability to use that method to reason publicly. 
Moreover, NICE and the CDF can help to clarify the status of PR as a pro tanto principle, subject to be 
overridden under certain circumstances. Part of the agenda of the latest democratically-elected British 
governments has been to use healthcare resource allocation policy to promote pharma growth. It can be 
argued that this fact confers democratic legitimacy to the goal of industry subsidisation and, therefore, 
provides a reason why the health secretary and his ministers should integrate it into 1,&(·V mission. This 
reason would have been particularly strong if the importance of integrating industry subsidisation and value 
for money for patients in healthcare resource allocation policy had been a focus of WKHZLQQLQJSDUW\·V
manifesto or otherwise of the latest electoral campaign of the prime minister. At any rate, there is at least a 
set of possible countervailing considerations to be carefully considered against PR, with the CDF and other 
cases. 
For reasons of space, I will not be able to determine exactly under what conditions these considerations 
of electoral democratic legitimacy can justifiably outweigh PR or which other considerations, if any, can 
override it. These issues concern how strong the pro tanto reasons provided by PR are. To solve them, I 
would need to get to the bottom of the intricate debate over the justification for, and, therefore, the value 
we should assign to, public reason, choosing among the justifications I outlined in the introduction and 
many others that have been proposed. All I can do in this article is suggest that PR is strong enough not to 
be trumped by two further initially plausible aspiring countervailing principles. 
Potential reformers might realise that the mission of an administrative agency is built upon a serious 
misunderstanding of its policy area. Here the issue is not the platform on which potential reformers were 
elected³whether it included the reform of that agency or anything similar. They simply have solid reasons 
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to believe that restraint on their part would be tantamount to cementing a big mistake. When big mistakes 
are on the table, should not a principle to do the right thing trump PR, mandating that all the necessary 
corrective elements be added to the existing mission of the administrative agency? 
I believe it should not. In these sorts of cases, potential reformers should neither violate PR nor refrain 
from reform. They should be bold enough to discard the old mission of the agency in order to rethink it 
radically, with an eye on rebuilding it around a new mix of values that are close enough to one another, 
therefore protecting the ability of public administrators to reason publicly. This reaction seems preferable 
to violating PR also from the perspective of correcting the mistakes that triggered reform. Indeed, it is hard 
to imagine how it could be better to keep the old, misguided mission and blend it with new elements that 
are distant enough from it to counteract those mistakes.5 
$VVXPLQJSXUHO\ IRU WKHVDNHRIDUJXPHQW WKDWKHKDG LGHQWLILHGDPLVWDNHDW WKHKHDUWRI1,&(·V
understanding of the economics of the NHS, the then health secretary Andrew Lansley announced in 2010 
a reform of NICE that, had it ever been pursued, would have exemplified the bold attitude I have sketched. 
Lansley rejected the very principle that clinically effective drugs should ever be turned down based on cost 
considerations, implicitly rejecting the need to look at the opportunity costs of new technologies and, in 
turn, at value for money across the population; frontline clinicians should be wholly in charge of prescribing 
drugs to their patients (Boseley, 2010). This proposal disregarded the basic fact that NHS budgets are finite. 
Consequently, it highlighted no big mistake at the heart of NICE. But let us imagine for a moment that 
Lansley·VDQDO\VLV effectively identified such a crucial mistake. Pursuing his proposal to the point of shutting 
down 1,&(·VKHDOWKtechnology appraisal process would have clearly solved the mistake in question much 
more effectively than violating PR by switching to a loosely-interconnected set of ends, to be served by 
NICE, still including value for money. 
Readers might suggest that there is a different sense in which the mission of an administrative agency 
might be built on a mistake: whenever it ignores the interests of any of the main stakeholders affected by 
the agency. The job of administrative agencies should be to further the interests of all affected parties 
efficiently. Consequently, mechanisms of stakeholder involvement should be created, so that every group 
can have a say in what agencies do. However, involving all stakeholders (in the case of NICE including 
industry) in DQDJHQF\·V decision-making comes at the expense of the coherence of its mission. Should we 
ever sacrifice PR for this principle of democratic accountability calling for stakeholder involvement?  
My answer is again negative. This particular principle of democratic accountability would fit well within 
so-called aggregative theories of democracy, which are ultimately concerned with the mere interests of 
individuals, calling for the institutional arrangements that aggregate such interests in the best way, which 
generally means to advance them most efficiently across society. In fact, negotiation among stakeholders is 
typically proposed as one such arrangement. However, implicit in my choice to draw upon Richardson is a 
rejection of aggregative democracy that goes all the way down to public administration. Richardson and 
public reason theorists in general are deliberative democrats, who require that the interests of individuals and 
groups be justifiable in an appropriate way, or else they should not drive political decision-making. 
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The deliberative camp emerged in opposition to aggregative democracy, raising numerous objections 
against the idea that institutions are meant to efficiently further the interests of stakeholders (Dryzek, 2000: 
31-56; Young, 2000: 16-51). One such objection is that, given their disregard for public justifiability, 
aggregative conceptions are especially prone to reinforcing existing distributions of power, e.g. by proposing 
decision-making methods that systematically JRWKHPDMRULW\·VZD\ (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004: 16). 
This objection finds concrete confirmation in several critical explorations of stakeholder participation in 
healthcare resource allocation, including NICE. Different interest groups³for example, different patient-
advocacy groups³are more or less successful in influencing decision-making depending on the amount of 
resources they can draw upon (Goddard et al., 2006: 83-85). Among them, industry emerges as uniquely 
influential, capable of even using patient groups as its ¶JURXQG WURRSV· LQ VWHHULQJ SROLF\ (Ferner and 
McDowell, 2006).  
The considerations advanced in the last two paragraphs only exclude involvement mechanisms that 
leave stakeholders free to work for their sectional interests³the sort of involvement detrimental to 
coherence and inconsistent with PR. I do not wish to deny the importance of stakeholder involvement in 
public administration, SURYLGHGWKDWVWDNHKROGHUV·UHSUHVHQWDWLYHs accept that their role is to contribute to 
the coherent specification of the mission of the agency in question (Richardson, 2002: 219-222). 
  
5. Two objections 
This section will reply to two possible objections. The first objection draws upon the framework of 
¶VHQVHPDNLQJ·, prominent in social psychology. Psychologists describe sensemaking as commonly used to 
arrive at decisions within organisations, especially in the face of unusual problems. To make decisions, 
members often ask what they are all about as an organisation, choosing a course of action accordingly. Thus 
far, this picture matches the normative account of specification RI DQ DJHQF\·V PLVVLRQ proposed by 
Richardson for administrators. However, the scholars of sensemaking stress how organisational members 
can often PDNHVHQVHRIWKHLURUJDQLVDWLRQ·VLGHQWLW\HYHQZKHQWKHIRUPDOGirectives making up its mission 
are inconsistent. This is because members build sense out of formal directives as well as informal traditions 
and tacit understandings within the organisation (Weick et al., 2005: 410). Moreover, they are often found 
not to feel constrained in a strict sense by formal directives and the rest of their context; they bracket or 
actively reconstruct elements of such context during sensemaking (Weick, 1995: 6-16 and 30-38). But if 
coherence can be created despite inconsistent directives, a critic might suggest, PR becomes redundant and 
should be rejected. 
A closer look demonstrates how the literature on sensemaking does not actually make PR redundant. 
First, the scholars of sensemaking explain that it can fail, even to the point of leading a hospital to abysmal 
performance rates or a firefighting team to be decimated in the field. Importantly, they describe how 
excessively inconsistent stimuli, generated for example by too many conflicting principles for action or too 
many sub-cultures organisational members have to navigate, are among the main causes of such failures 
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(Weick, 1993: 634-636; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2003: 78). Therefore, PR, which protects the coherence of the 
formal system of ends handed down to administrators, is helpful to keep failures of sensemaking at bay. 
Second, researchers highlight how sensemaking ¶OLHVLPSRUWDQWO\LQWKHKDQGVRIRWKHUV·HVSHFLDOO\of 
powerful outside actors. If members see that the view they have developed RIWKHLURUJDQLVDWLRQ·VLGHQWLW\
is not accepted outside the organisation, this will destabilise their efforts at sensemaking, which they will 
restart, potentially in a recursive way (Weick et al., 2005: 416-417). Imagine that different reformers have 
over time revised the mission of an administrative agency with no respect for PR, adding more and more 
ends that point in radically different directions. AQ\FRKHUHQWYLHZRIWKLVDJHQF\·VLGHQWLW\now requires 
much of the above-mentioned effort, on the part of administrators, to bracket some parts of their formal 
mandate and radically reconstruct others. However, the greater this effort, the higher the risk that the 
identity administrators come up with will not be confirmed by elected politicians and other outside actors, 
who have the logical space to combine in markedly different ways the disparate elements making up the 
DJHQF\·VIRUPDOPDQGDWH. Rather than being able to rely upon a coherent view of their DJHQF\·V identity to 
reason publicly, administrators risk being thrown back, perhaps recursively, to the preliminary task of 
sensemaking. Under PR, the crucial ability of administrators to PDNH FRKHUHQW VHQVH RI WKHLU DJHQF\·V
identity is therefore on much firmer ground. Additionally, under PR WKHZD\WRDFRKHUHQWYLHZRIRQH·V
DJHQF\·VLGHQWLW\GRHVnot necessarily go through ignoring or revolutionising formal directives handed down 
by actors higher up in the democratic decision-making hierarchy, vindicating PR also from the perspective 
of democratic legitimacy. 
The second objection is that PR displaces rather than solves the problems it should tackle. The growth 
of industry, including the pharmaceutical sector, should be a concern of the British government at large, if 
not perhaps of its Department of Health. Conflicts between the most disparate ends, banished by PR from 
administrative agencies, will always characterise the activities of government cabinets. Also, although the 
passage from a government cabinet to single government departments already provides the opportunity to 
restrict the attention of decision-makers to substantially fewer values, considerably more closely connected 
to each other, each department will necessarily be in charge of more values than its individual administrative 
agencies. Does public reason gain anything from PR, or is PR just displacing incoherence to different levels? 
The starting point of this article was that a great many important decisions are rightly made not only 
within each government department, but also within specific agencies such as NICE. Therefore, PR 
improves the so-called determinacy of public reason, i.e., the ability of decision-makers to provide 
determinate answers to the questions they face without relying upon intuitions to arbitrate value conflicts 
or otherwise drawing upon resources external to public reason (Schwartzman, 2004). In fact, if PR is 
observed, at least decision-makers from within administrative agencies become able to provide such 
answers. The question of how public reason·VLQGHWHUPLQDF\ can be reduced also at the level of government 
cabinets and government departments tackling inter-agency tensions is important and should be the subject 
of further analysis. However, it does not erase 35·V important contribution to public reason. 
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6. Conclusion 
My argument has reinforced my initial call for normative political theorists, particularly if interested in 
public reason, to finally put administrative agencies firmly on their radar. Closer attention should be paid 
to both public administrators and their relationship with other levels of political decision-making if we want 
the requirements of public reason to be met in society7KLVDUWLFOH·VFRQWULEXWLRQhas been to propose PR, 
which constitutes a first step towards a normative theory of the reform of administrative agencies. I have 
argued that PR preserves the ability of public administrators to transparently justify to the public the creative 
political decisions they routinely have to make. My justification for PR has used as a case study the CDF, a 
recent reform to NICE. At the same time, to bring such reform together with a discussion of PR has 
brought to light fresh reasons why commentators should be worried about the CDF. 
 
Notes 
1 For a review of the debate over the justifications for and the structure of public reason, see Quong (2013). 
2 For the relation between specification and transparency, see Richardson (1990). 
3 )RUVLPSOLFLW\·VVDNH,DPLJQRULQJWKHSKLORVRSKLFDOVHQVHLn which it can be said that the specification of an existing 
value leads to a brand-new value. 
4 )RU1,&(·VSURFHVVLQJHQHUDOVHH1,&(: esp. 72-74). For the criteria other than cost-effectiveness, see NICE 
(2008) and Rawlins et al. (2010).  
5 A natural question arising at this point is, what should administrators do if politicians are not bold enough to radically 
rethink the mission of their agency, patching up existing problems by giving the agency new operational mandates? 
More in general, what should administrators do if PR has been violated and they are therefore handed down ends that 
GHOLYHUDEORZWRWKHFRKHUHQFHRIWKHLUDJHQF\·VPLVVLRQ"Should they speak against the reforms in question while 
they are still under deliberation, but no later than that? Should they call on politicians to reconsider their decisions 
after they have been made? Should they ever work out on their own an updated understanding RI WKHLU DJHQF\·V
mission that meets minimal standards of coherence? These very important questions are extremely complex, and I 
will simply have to leave them for another day. 
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